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The New Concept of
‘‘Significant Market
Power’’ in Electronic
Communications: the
Hybridisation of the
Sectoral Regulation
by Competition Law
Alexandre de Streel *
Introduction: a major reform in telecoms
The newly adopted European regulatory framework for
electronic communications1 is mainly composed of four
directives2 whose national transposition measures
should be applicable in July 2003. As suggested by its
denomination and to take into account the techno-
logical convergence, the new package covers not only
telecommunications but all electronic communications
networks, services and associated facilities. It therefore
applies to all networks permitting the conveyance of
signals (being wire or wireless, circuit or packet
switched, used for telecom, broadcasting or other serv-
ices), all the services consisting of the conveyance of
signals on these networks, and all facilities that are
associated with them (like conditional access systems
contained in the set-top boxes used to receive digital
television or electronic program guides). On the other
hand, the package does not cover the content of services
delivered over electronic communications networks
such as broadcasting or e-commerce services.
The basic thrust of the directives is that citizens’
interests are best served by market forces and that
regulation should be kept to a minimum. However, as
shown by economic theory, markets do not lead to a
social optimum when firms enjoy substantial market
power that they may abuse for their individual interest
and at the expense of general welfare. The acquisition
and exercise of this market power is usually controlled
by antitrust, either in a preventive way (ex ante) when
firms come together to form a joint venture or a
concentration, or in a repressive way (ex post) when an
anti-competitive agreement or abuse is committed.
Nevertheless, antitrust control may be inefficient in
certain market structures, hence a general ex ante
control is necessary. This is the purpose of the significant
market power (SMP) regulation, i.e. to control market
power when antitrust would be inefficient to do so.
This SMP regime has been radically reformed by the
new regulatory framework. Under the previous direc-
tives, the so-called 1998 package,3 the market areas to
be regulated were pre-defined in the directives on the
basis of technical characteristics4 and the SMP threshold
generally equated to 25 per cent market share in these
areas. The National Regulatory Authority (NRA) had
* Former expert at the European Commission, Brussels and
Researcher at the European University Institute, Florence. The
opinions expressed are purely personal and do not necessarily
reflect those of the European Commission. The paper reflects the
law as of April 1, 2003, unless stated otherwise.
1 On the new framework, see A. Bavasso, Communications in
EU Antitrust Law: Market Power and Public Interest (Kluwer
Law International, 2003); S. Farr and V. Oakley, EU Commu-
nications Law (Palladian Law, 2002); L. Garzaniti, Telecommu-
nications, Broadcasting and the Internet: EU Competition Law
and Regulation (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003); C. Koenig,
A. Bartosh and D. Braun (eds), EU Competition and Tele-
communications Law (Kluwer Law International, 2002); P.
Nihoul and P. Rodford, EU Electronic Communications Law:
Competition and Regulation in the European Telecommunica-
tions Market (OUP, 2003).
2 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of March 7, 2002 on a common regulatory framework
for electronic communications networks and services: [2002]
O.J. L108/33; Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of March 7, 2002 on the authorisation of
electronic communications networks and services: [2002] O.J.
L108/21; Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of March 7, 2002 on access to, and inter-
connection of, electronic communications networks and services:
[2002] O.J. L108/7; Directive 2002/22/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of March 7, 2002 on universal
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications
networks and services: [2002] O.J. L108/51.
3 On the 1998 package, see M. Cave and L. Prosperetti,
‘‘European Telecommunications Infrastructures’’ [2001] Oxford
Review of Economic Policy 4; P. Larouche, Competition Law
and Regulation in European Telecommunications (Hart, 2000);
J. Scherer (ed.), Telecommunications in Europe (Sweet & Max-
well, 1998); I. Walden & J. Angel (ed.), Telecommunications
Law (Blackstone Press, 2001).
4 Under the 1998 regulatory framework, mainly four markets
were defined: fixed voice telephony (Directive 98/10 and Annex
1, Pt 1 of the Directive 97/33), mobile voice telephony (Annex 1,
Pt 3 of the Directive 97/33), leased lines (Directive 92/44 and
Annex 1, Pt 2 of the Directive 97/33), national fixed and mobile
interconnection (Art.7(2) of the Directive 97/33). See note from
the Commission services/DG XIII of March 1, 1999, ‘‘Determi-
nation of Organisations with Significant Market Power’’, avail-
able at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/
SMPdeter.pdf.
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then to impose on the SMP operators the full set of
obligations provided in the directives without being able
to choose the most appropriate ones. The new regime
has now been aligned on competition law principles.5
This move was justified for several reasons: first, to
make the regime more flexible than was the case pre-
viously and get regulatory decisions closer to the eco-
nomic reality of the market; secondly, to maintain legal
certainty, as decisions will be based on more than forty
years of well-established antitrust case law; thirdly, to
ensure a better harmonisation of regulatory decisions
across Europe, as they will be based on legal principles
that are strongly ‘‘Europeanised’’ and the control of the
Commission over the NRA’s decisions will be reinforced
(due to the Commission’s important antitrust powers
under the EC Treaty); fourthly, to ensure a progressive
removal of obligations as competition develops on the
different markets (market-by-market sunset clauses) and
facilitate the transition towards the pure application of
competition law when sector-specific regulation will no
longer be necessary.
The new SMP regime is now based on a three step
process.6 In the first step, markets to be analysed are
defined in two sequences. The Commission periodically
adopts a recommendation7 that defines, in accordance
with the principles of competition law, the product and
service markets within the electronic communications
sector, the characteristics of which may be such as to
justify the imposition of regulatory obligations. In prac-
tice, the Commission has to select the markets justifying
ex ante regulation because of their structural problems,
and then delineate the boundaries of these markets on
the basis of antitrust methodologies. Taking account8 of
this recommendation on relevant markets and the Com-
mission Guidelines on market analysis,9 the NRA then
defines markets appropriate to national circumstances,
in particular their geographical dimension within its
territory, in accordance with the principles of competi-
tion law.
In the second step, the NRA analyses the defined
markets to determine whether they are, or are not,
effectively competitive, which amounts to determining
whether one or more operators enjoy SMP on the
market. In turn, this SMP assessment amounts to deter-
mining whether one or more undertakings enjoy a
dominant position (as defined under European competi-
tion law) or could leverage a dominant position from a
closely related market.
In the third step, if the market is effectively com-
petitive, the NRA must withdraw any obligation that
may be in place and may not impose or maintain any
new ones. Conversely, if the market is not effectively
competitive, the NRA imposes on the SMP operators
the appropriate specific regulatory obligations to be
chosen from a menu provided in the directives. In the
case of an SMP operator on a wholesale market (i.e. the
relationship between the providers of electronic commu-
nications networks and services), the regulator should
rely on the menu of remedies provided in the Access
Directive10 comprising five ascending behavioural obli-
gations: transparency, non-discrimination, accounting
separation, third-party access, and price control. Excep-
tionally, and with the prior agreement of the Commis-
5 On the use of competition law in electronic communications
sector: ‘‘Commission Guidelines on the application of EEC
Competition rules in the Telecommunications sector’’ [1991]
O.J. C233/2; ‘‘Commission Notice on the application of com-
petition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications
sector’’, hereinafter ‘‘Access Notice’’ [1998] O.J. C265/2C;
‘‘Communication from the Commission on the Unbundled
Access to the Local Loop: Enabling the Competitive Provision of
a full range of Electronic Communication Services, including
Broadband Multimedia and High-Speed Internet’’ [2000] O.J.
C272/55. See also the references cited in n.1; C.D. Ehlermann
and L. Gosling (eds), European Competition Law Annual 1998:
Regulating Communications Markets (Hart, 2000); J. Faull & A.
Nikpay (eds), The EC Law of Competition (OUP, 1999), Ch.11;
P. Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European
Telecommunications (Hart, 2000); P. Roth (ed.), Bellamy and
Child: European Community Law of Competition (5th ed.,
Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), Ch.14; J. Temple Lang, ‘‘Media,
multimedia and European Community antitrust law’’, in B.
Hawk (ed.) Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law
Institute (Juris, 1998), Ch.18; H. Ungerer, ‘‘EU Competition law
in the telecommunications, media and information technology
sectors’’, in B. Hawk (ed.) Annual Proceedings of the Fordham
Corporate Law Institute (Juris, 1996), Ch.24.
6 Arts 14 to 16 of the Framework Directive, Art.8 of the Access
Directive and Art.17 of the Universal Service Directive. See also
the website of the European Regulators Group, which is com-
posed of the NRAs of all the Member States and the Commis-
sion: http://erg.eu.int, with a working paper on the SMP concept.
For a complete description of the regime, see A. de Streel, ‘‘The
Integration of Competition Principles in the New European
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications’’ [2003]
World Competition.
7 Commission Recommendation of February 11, 2003 on rele-
vant product and service markets within the electronic commu-
nications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance
with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic
communications networks and services [2003] O.J. L114/45,
hereinafter ‘‘recommendation on relevant markets’’, and the
explanatory memorandum available at www.europa.eu.int/
information_society/topics/telecoms/index_en.htm. See also A de
Streel, ‘‘Market definitions in the new European regulatory
framework for electronic communications’’ [2003] Info 5(3),
27–47.
8 Any recommendation or soft law instruments should be taken
into account by national authorities and national Courts; see
Grimaldi C–322/88 1989 E.C.R. I–4407, para.18. The legal
force of the recommendation on relevant markets is further
reinforced as the Commission may veto any different product
and service market that an NRA may wish to define.
9 Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment
of significant market power under the Community regulatory
framework for electronic communications networks and services:
[2002] O.J. C165/6, hereinafter ‘‘Guidelines on market analysis’’.
10 Arts 8 to 13 of the Access Directive.
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sion, the NRA may also impose other remedies, possibly
a structural one like divestiture. In the case of an SMP
operator on the retail market (i.e. the relationship
between operators and end-users) and insufficiency of
remedies at the wholesale level, the regulator should rely
on the non-exhaustive list of remedies provided in the
Universal Service Directive11: price control, accounting
obligation, interdiction of discrimination or bundling.
The choice12 of obligations made by the NRA should be
based on the nature of the problem identified and
justified in light of the three objectives of the new
framework (effective competition, internal market, and
interests of the European citizens13). It should also be
proportionate, which implies that it should be the least
burdensome option possible to achieve the regulatory
aim.
This three step process shall be repeated periodically
to ensure that obligations are adapted to the market
evolution. During the whole process, the role of the
Commission is very important. It starts the procedure by
adopting and updating the recommendation on relevant
markets. More importantly, the Commission may
review14 all of an NRA’s decisions that would affect the
trade between Member States.15 It can veto a product
and service market definition that differs from those of
the recommendation and an SMP (or a non-SMP)
designation, and it can give a non-binding opinion on
the choice of regulatory obligations.
The remaining part of this article details the two first
steps of the regime.
Market definition
Selection of the markets
In the electronic communications sector, lots of markets
may be defined and several may lead to competition
concerns, but only a sub-set of them are selected to be
analysed by an NRA. According to the directives,16 this
selection should be based on the characteristics of the
market, and more precisely on the relative efficiency of
competition law remedies compared to sectoral reme-
dies to address possible competition problems. In the
recommendation on relevant markets,17 the Commis-
sion has interpreted these provisions by referring to
three cumulative criteria that should be fulfilled for a
market to be selected.
The first criterion is static and relies on the presence of
high and non-transitory barriers to entry. The barriers
may be structural and result from original cost and
demand economic conditions that create asymmetric
conditions between incumbents and new entrants
impeding or preventing market entry of the latter.18 The
entry barriers may also be legal or regulatory and result
from legislative, administrative or other state measures
that have a direct effect on the conditions of entry.19
Both types of barriers are non-strategic (i.e. not artifi-
cially manufactured by the firms), as it was considered
that strategic barriers like excessive investment or rein-
forcement of network effects would require idiosyn-
cratic and episodic intervention, which would be better
done under competition law.
The second criterion is dynamic and amounts to
evaluating if the market has the characteristics such that
it will tend towards effective competition over the
relevant time horizon considered. If it is the case, the
market should not be selected. The application of this
criterion involves examining the state of competition
behind the entry barriers, taking account of the fact that
even when a market is characterised by high entry
barriers, other structural factors or market character-
istics may mean that it tends towards effective competi-
tion. This is, for instance, the case in markets with a
limited but sufficient number of undertakings behind
the entry barriers having diverging cost structures and
facing a price-elastic market demand. Entry barriers
may also become less relevant with regard to innova-
tion-driven markets characterised by ongoing techno-
logical progress. In such cases, competitive constraints
often come from the threat of innovation by potential
competitors that are not currently in the market.
11 Art.17 of the Universal Service Directive
12 Art.8(4) of the Access Directive and Art.17(2) of the Univer-
sal Service Directive, and Guidelines on market analysis, para.
118.
13 Art.8 of the Framework Directive.
14 Art.7 of the Framework Directive and Commission Recom-
mendation of July 23, 2003 on notifications, time limits and
consultations provided for in Art.7 of Directive 2002/21/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council on a common
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks
and services [2003] O.J. L190/13.
15 See Recital 38 of the Framework Directive.
16 Art.15(1) and Recital 27 of the Framework Directive.
17 Recitals 9 to 16 of the Recommendation on relevant markets,
as explained by s.3.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum. For the
first recommendation on relevant markets, the Commission was
instructed by the European legislature to include all the markets
listed in Annex I of the Framework Directive. This list mainly
corresponds to the markets regulated under the 1998 regulatory
framework, albeit defined more precisely.
18 That may be the case for the last mile of the telecom fixed
infrastructure (the so-called local loop between the customers’
premises and the operators’ Main Distribution Frame) in coun-
tries where there are no other substitutable technologies like
cable.
19 That may be the case when only a limited number of
undertakings have access to spectrum frequencies for the provi-
sion of the underlying services.
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The third criterion relies on the relative efficiency of
competition law remedies alone to address the market
failure identified according to the two first criteria,
compared to the use of complementary ex ante regula-
tion. It is fulfilled when ex ante regulation would
address the market failure more efficiently than anti-
trust. Such circumstances would, e.g., include situations
where the compliance requirements of intervention are
extensive, where frequent and/or timely intervention is
indispensable, or where creating legal certainty is of
paramount concern.
These three criteria show that the rationale justifying
the regulation of SMP operators has been radically
revised. Under the 1998 framework, the SMP regime
was mainly related to the competitive conditions under
which infrastructures have been deployed. It mainly
applied to markets previously under legal monopoly
(fixed voice networks and services and leased lines20)
and was thus linked to the so-called ‘‘original sin’’ of the
previous monopolist. Under the new directives, the SMP
regulation is disconnected from the original sin, and
linked to the inefficiency of antitrust to control market
power. It therefore represents a radical shift of the
regulatory paradigm. Ironically, this may lead to an
extension or even a perpetuation of sectoral regulation,
even though the new directives were deemed to be
de-regulatory. Indeed, the first Commission recommen-
dation on relevant markets identifies 18 markets to be
analysed, and will probably lead to more regulation (at
least in the mobile sector).
Delimitation of the relevant markets 21
Having identified the problematic areas, the precise
boundaries of the market should be delineated in accor-
dance with the principles of competition law.22 A rele-
vant market combines a product/service dimension with
a geographical dimension. To determine both dimen-
sions, the competitive constraints (i.e. the demand and
supply substitutions) that will discipline the firms’
behaviours should be identified, with the so-called
‘‘hypothetical monopolist test’’.
To apply the test,23 the regulator starts by character-
ising the retail markets over a given time horizon. The
product market definition should be primarily based on
the needs of the end-users, and not necessarily on the
technology used.24 Clearly, customers’ needs and prefer-
ences may be linked to specific technologies. For
instance, fixed and mobile telephony are not in the same
market because of the additional mobility feature
offered by the latter,25 and voice over Public Switched
Telecom Network and voice over Internet Protocol may
be in separate markets due to the additional quality of
the former.26 However, as technologies converge, con-
sumers’ preferences are less linked to technologies. For
instance, consumers may be indifferent about receiving
their broadband Internet connections via Digital Sub-
scriber Line (DSL) technologies over telecom copper
pair or via cable modem over broadcast cable infra-
structure. In other words, the customer categories
(large, medium and small corporate customers as well as
individuals) should be more appropriate than techno-
logical categories as a basis to define product markets.27
In addition, as sectoral regulation intervenes ex ante and
for the future, the markets should be defined on a
forward-looking basis, taking into account the develop-
ments foreseen over a reasonable period of time.
On the basis of retail market definitions, the regulator
then defines the relevant linked wholesale or inter-
mediate markets because wholesale customers are, by
identity, the retail suppliers. An NRA has to determine
the necessary service or infrastructure for an operator to
enter a specific retail market. For example, if it is
considered that Digital Subscriber Lines and cable
modem are in the same retail Internet broadband access
market, then it could be deduced that in this instance
telecom and cable infrastructures are part of the same
20 There was nevertheless a slight possibility of regulating the
mobile sector, that has been used more and more over time by the
regulators across Europe: Art.7(2) of the Interconnection Direc-
tive 97/33.
21 S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition
Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed., 2002), Ch.3; M. Motta,
Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (CUP, 2003), Ch.3;
W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, ‘‘Market Power in Antitrust
Cases’’ [1981] Harvard Law Review 94(5), 937–996.
22 Art.15 of the Framework Directive, and Commission Notice
on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Commu-
nity competition law: [1997] O.J. C372/5.
23 s.4 of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Recommenda-
tion on the relevant markets. In addition, see three studies made
for the Commission services: Squire-Sanders-Dempsey and WIK
Consult, ‘‘Market Definitions for Regulatory Obligations in
Communications Markets’’, July 2002; Europe Economics,
‘‘Market Definition in the Media Sector—Economic Issues’’,
November 2002; Bird and Bird, ‘‘Market Definition in the Media
Sector: Comparative Legal Analysis’’, December 2002, available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/publica
tions/#media; and also J. Gual, ‘‘Market Definition in the
Telecoms Industry’’, September 2002, available at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/telecom/conference.
html.
24 Guidelines on market analysis, paras 63–69.
25 Decision of the Commission of September 20, 2001, Pirelli/
Editizione/Telecom Italia M.2574, para.33.
26 Communication from the Commission on the Status of voice
on the Internet under Community law: [2000] O.J. C369/3.
27 For that reason, the Recommendation on relevant market
distinguishes the retail services provided to residential and non-
residential customers (respectively markets 1, 3, 4 and markets 2,
5, 6).
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wholesale market.28 At this stage, the consideration of
supply-side substitution is of the utmost importance and
the markets should not be defined too narrowly.
A particular and politically very sensitive topic is the
definition of the mobile termination market.29 In the
European mobile industry, the prevalent tariff principle
is the so-called ‘‘calling-party-pays’’: the called party—
who chooses the network which has to be called—does
not have to pay for the call, whereas the calling party—
who usually cannot choose the network—has to pay for
the call. There is a dichotomy between the person who
pays and the one who chooses: in other words, the
called party imposes a negative externality on the calling
party. It is therefore plausible that the called network
may increase profitably its termination charges from 5
to 10 per cent, because on the one hand the calling
network (and ultimately the calling customer) has no
choice but to use the called network, and on the other
hand the called customer will not switch to another
network as he does not pay the termination charge.
Each network may therefore be defined as a separate
market with regard to wholesale termination.30
Obviously the market definition is an empirical exer-
cise and other factors may constrain the pricing behav-
iour of the called network. For example, the person
called may be sensitive about the cost of being reached
(in the case of close users’ groups or family and friends
when the called party actually pays the invoice of the
calling party), or there may exist a choice between the
different networks to be used (using call back or multi-
ple SIM cards if available31). If these factors are present,
termination may be defined more broadly and comprise
all the mobile networks of a specific country. But the
general point is that the market may be defined very
narrowly due to the specific tariff structure.
The geographical scope of the market is determined
by the area covered by the network and the existence of
legal and other regulatory instruments.32 In the past,
regulatory and technical restrictions clearly divided
telecommunications markets along national or regional
borders. Monopoly rights of the national telecommuni-
cations provider conferred its market an obvious
national dimension. Nowadays, as a consequence of the
liberalisation of telecommunications services and the
harmonisation of technical standards and licensing pro-
cedures across Europe, electronic communications serv-
ices can increasingly be provided or sold across national
borders with no restriction. As a consequence the
geographic markets may tend in some cases to expand
towards a European dimension.
Assessment of significant market power
Having defined the markets, an NRA must then analyse
them to find out if they are effectively competitive,
which amounts to determining if any operator enjoys a
dominant position or is able to leverage its dominant
position. According to the case law, a firm enjoys a
dominant position when, alone or collectively with
others, it has sufficient market power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of competitors, cus-
tomers, and ultimately consumers.33 It corresponds to a
certain degree of market power that enables its bene-
ficiaries to behave without much constraint and that has
been judged necessary to justify antitrust interventions.
As the SMP threshold has now been aligned to the
dominant position, the same level of market power will
also trigger sector-specific regulation. Moreover, as an
28 For this reason, the Recommendation on relevant markets
identifies a wholesale broadband access market (market 12)
covering bitstream access over telecom infrastructure and alter-
native wholesale access provided over other infrastructures (like
cable) if they offer facilities equivalent to bitstream access. In the
US, some consider also that DSL and cable should be part of the
same relevant market: R.W. Crandall, J.G. Sidak, H.J. Singer,
‘‘The Empirical Case Against Asymmetric Regulation of Broad-
band Internet Access’’ [2002] Berkeley Technology Law Journal
17, 953–987.
29 The termination charges are the wholesale charges that the
calling network pays to the called network to terminate a call.
For instance, if a customer of Vodafone calls a customer of
Orange, Vodafone will pay to Orange a charge for the call to be
terminated on Orange’s network.
30 The recommendation on relevant markets identifies a market
for voice call termination on an individual mobile network
(market 16). See further: Decision of the Commission of July 10,
2002 Telia/Sonera M.2803, para.31. That is also the position
adopted, inter alia, by the British regulator in 2001, and con-
firmed on appeal by the Competition Commission in 2003; see
Reports on references under s.13 of the Telecommunications Act
1984 on the charges made by Vodafone, O2, Orange and
T-Mobile for terminating calls from fixed and mobile networks,
February 2003, available at: www.competition-commission.
org.uk/reports/475mobilephones.htm£full. On the regulation of
mobile termination, see also P. Crocioni, ‘‘Should telecoms
liberalisation stops at call termination?’’ [2001] Telecommunica-
tions Policy 25, 39–58; A. Groebel, ‘‘Should we regulate any
aspects of wireless?’’ [2003] Telecommunications Policy 27,
435–455; J. Haucap, ‘‘The Economics of Mobile Regulation’’
Working Paper, University of the Federal Armed Forces Ham-
burg, March 2003.
31 The call back means that the called party will call back the
calling party. The multiple SIM cards means that the mobile
handset of the person called contains several SIM cards, hence
several networks may be used to reach him.
32 Guidelines on market analysis, paras 55–60. Nevertheless,
some have argued that the network coverage should be part of
the product dimension of the market and not its geographical
dimension: P. Larouche, ‘‘Relevant Market Definition in Net-
work Industries: Air Transport and Telecommunications’’ [2000]
Journal of Network Industries 407–445.
33 United Brands 27/76 1978 E.C.R. 207; Hoffman-La Roche
85/76 1979 E.C.R. 461; Art.14(2) of the Framework Directive.
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NRA intervenes ex ante and for the future, the market
power should be appraised on a forward-looking basis
by considering the expected and foreseeable develop-
ments over a reasonable period (linked to the character-
istics and the timing of the next market analysis), with
past data being taken into account when relevant.34
The assessment of single dominance35 is not an easy
task limited to the review of an exhaustive checklist, but
requires a thorough and overall analysis of the eco-
nomic characteristics of the relevant market to deter-
mine if one undertaking enjoys sufficient market power
to behave independently. An important criterion is the
market share: below 25 per cent absence of dominant
position may be presumed, whereas above 40 per cent
dominant position will be presumed, both presumptions
being refutable.36 The market shares should preferably
be measured in value because telecoms services are
differentiated, and not in volume or in terms of the
number of lines or termination points.37 Other criteria
are also important38: overall size of the undertaking,
technological advantage or superiority, absence of or
low countervailing buying power, easy or privileged
access to capital markets, product diversification, econ-
omies of scale and scope, vertical integration, highly
developed distribution network, absence of potential
competition, barriers to expansion, or the control of
essential facilities.
The assessment of collective dominance is more diffi-
cult.39 Two or more undertakings are in a collective
dominant position when, albeit remaining independent,
they behave like a single dominant entity. This parallel
behaviour may be due to structural links between the
firms (like agreements) or a market structure which
means that firms align their behaviours without any
concerted practices (pure tacit collusion). As noted in
AirTours, the proof of tacit collusion requires three
conditions to be fulfilled: transparency, possibility of
retaliation and no countervailing reaction of the fringe
competitors or the consumers. The appraisal of col-
lective dominance is complex, and the directives40 pro-
vide some assistance to the regulators with a list of
criteria that are neither exhaustive nor cumulative: inter
alia concentrated market, transparency, mature market,
similar cost structure and market shares, and possibility
of retaliatory mechanisms. Furthermore, the Commis-
sion has already adopted several merger decisions where
the concept of collective dominance has been applied to
the electronic communications sector.41 It was con-
sidered that the characteristics of the mobile telephony
market in Germany and in Belgium42 may lead to tacit
collusion; whereas the characteristics of the market for
dial-up Internet access in Ireland, the world-wide mar-
ket for the provision of global telecommunications
services, or the market for the provision of pan-Euro-
pean mobile services to internationally mobile custom-
ers43 would not lead to tacit collusion. But in general,
few electronic communications appear to fulfil the
conditions of collective dominance, particularly since
the concerns about the likelihood of tacitly collusive
behaviours by operators in setting bilateral termination
charges have now been abated by recent economic
research.44
Finally, when an operator enjoys a dominant position
on a specific market, it may be deemed to have SMP on
a closely related market if the links between the two
markets are such as to allow the market power held in
one market to be leveraged into the other market.45 But
this possibility may lead to excessive regulation, in
particular when applied to emerging markets46 and
should be used with extreme caution for two reasons.
First, vertical integration is not usually anti-competitive.
When a firm enjoys substantial market power, there is
only one monopoly rent to be gained and there is
34 Guidelines on market analysis, paras 20 and 75.
35 ibid., paras 72–82.
36 Recital 15 of the Council Merger Regulation 4064/89/EEC;
Akzo C–62/86 1991 E.C.R. I–3359, para. 60; Irish Sugar
T–228/97 1999 E.C.R. II–2969, para.70.
37 Guidelines on market analysis, paras 76–77; Notice on
market definition, paras 53–55; Note from the Commission
services/DG XIII of March 1, 1999, ‘‘Determination of Organisa-
tions with Significant Market Power’’, available at http://euro-
pa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/SMPdeter.pdf.
38 Guidelines on market analysis, para.78.
39 ibid., paras 86–106; Gencor T–102/96 1999 E.C.R. II–753,
paras 276–277; Compagnie Maritime Belge C–395/96,
C–396/96P 2000 E.C.R. I–1365, para.39; AirTours T–342/99
2002 E.C.R. II–2585, para.62.
40 Annex II of the Framework Directive.
41 See also P. Rey, ‘‘Collective Dominance and the telecommuni-
cations industry’’, September 2002, available at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/telecom/conference.
html.
42 Respectively Decision of the Commission of May 21, 1999,
Vodafone/AirTouch M.1430, para.28 and Decision of the Com-
mission of July 11, 2000, France Telecom/Orange M.2016,
para.26.
43 Respectively Decision of the Commission of March 27, 2000,
BT/Esat M.1838, paras 10–14; Decision of the Commission of
June 26, 2000, MCIWorldCom/Sprint M.1741, paras 258–302;
Decision of the Commission of July 11, 2000, France Telecom/
Orange M.2016, paras 39–40.
44 M. Armstrong, ‘‘The Theory of Access Pricing and Inter-
connection’’, in M. Cave, S. Majumdar, I. Vogelsang (eds)
Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, V.I: Structure,
Regulation and Competition (North Holland, 2002),
pp.297–386.
45 Art.14(3) of the Framework Directive. See also Tetra Pak II
C–333/94P 1996 E.C.R. I–5951.
46 Guidelines on market analysis, para.84.
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usually no need to use vertical integration and fore-
closure strategies to reap this rent. It is therefore only in
exceptional circumstances when the monopoly rent
cannot be gained on the monopolised market that
vertical integration and market foreclosure are anti-
competitive.47 Secondly, even if vertical integration was
anti-competitive, it is more appropriate to impose obli-
gations on the dominated market (often the upstream
infrastructure market) where the source of the competi-
tion problem lies, instead of imposing obligations on the
leveraged market (often the downstream service market)
where the consequences are felt. Therefore, the regula-
tion of the downstream market would only be justified
when upstream regulation is impossible or too late due
to the lack of transparency of the wholesale terms and
conditions.48
Conclusion: comparison between the SMP
regime and competition law49
Even though the new concept of significant market
power has been aligned on the antitrust concept of
dominant position, competition law and sector-specific
regulation do not coincide and should not be confused
with each other. In general, they should be seen as
complementary and not as substitutes. The objectives of
both instruments tend to converge towards the pursuit
of effective competition.50 The scope of both instru-
ments overlap as sectoral regulation applies to market
structures where antitrust would be inefficient and
competition policy applies across the board to all types
of market structure.
On the other hand, the conditions of intervention
vary according to the instruments. The SMP regime is
limited to the market fulfilling certain criteria and then
applies generally each time there are dominant opera-
tors. Competition law is triggered by a specific behav-
iour of the firms (abuse of dominant position, agreement
or concerted practice, concentration) that should be
proved to be anti-competitive. Therefore, the burden of
proof for an NRA is fairly high when selecting a market,
but becomes quite low to intervene. It is certainly lower
than under competition law as there is no need to show
any specific anti-competitive behaviour. Moreover, the
appraisal of the intervention conditions (definition of
market and assessment of market power) may differ
under antitrust and sectoral regulation as the use of
identical methodologies in different contexts may lead
to different results.51 The market is usually defined more
broadly under sector-specific law than under competi-
tion. An NRA starts from a broader perspective and
adopts a prospective approach, whereas the antitrust
authority deals with a precise event that may be linked
to one or more undertakings around which the market
is defined. Similarly, the SMP operator does not neces-
sarily enjoy a dominant position under Art.82 EC, as
the relevant market may be defined differently and SMP
is assessed more prospectively.
Finally, the remedies that may be imposed, or at least
the principle guiding their selection, also differs under
both instruments. With the decentralisation of competi-
tion law52 and the new electronic communications
directives, it is now clarified that both behavioural and
structural remedies may be imposed under antitrust as
well as under sectoral law. But the priority principle will
vary. Under sectoral law and Art.82 EC, there is a
priority for behavioural remedies and some sectoral
remedies may go further than the antitrust one.53 Under
47 P. Rey, P. Seabright, J. Tirole, The Activities of a Monopoly
Firm in Adjacent Competitive Markets: Economic Consequences
and Implications for Competition Policy (Working Paper, Uni-
versity of Toulouse, 2001).
48 For instance, if an incumbent operator wishes to leverage in
an anti-competitive way its dominant position on the wholesale
fixed local access to the retail internet access via DSL services, it
is more appropriate to regulate the local access market.
49 For the relationship between competition law and the sector-
specific regulation, see the references cited in n.1; and B. Doh-
erty, ‘‘Competition Law and Sector-Specific Regulation’’ [2001]
C.T.L.R. 8, 225–232; ITU, ‘‘Competition Policy in Telecommu-
nications’’ Background paper for the workshop held on
November 22, 2002, available at: www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/com-
petition/documents.html; M. Kerf and D. Ge´radin, ‘‘Controlling
Market Power in Telecommunications: Antitrust vs Sector-
Specific Regulation’’ (OUP, 2003); P. Larouche, Competition
Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications (Hart,
2000); H. Ungerer, ‘‘Introduction of competition in the commu-
nications markets—The European experience’’, September 20,
2001, available at www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
speeches/. For a US perspective: H.A. Shelanski, ‘‘From sector-
specific regulation to antitrust for US telecommunications: The
prospects for transition’’ [2002] Telecommunications Policy
335–355.
50 Along the same lines, see the speech of Commissioner Monti,
‘‘Competition and regulation in the new framework’’, July 15,
2003, available at www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
speeches/. On the goals of competition law, see C.D. Ehlermann
and L.L. Laudati (eds), European Competition Law Annual: The
Objectives of Competition Policy (Hart, 1997).
51 Guidelines on market analysis, paras 24–32.
52 Art.7(1) of the Council Regulation 1/2003 of December 16,
2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid
down in Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty: [2003] O.J. L1/1.
53 Access Notice, para.15. For instance, compulsory access or
cost orientation may more easily be imposed under sectoral
regulation than antitrust.
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merger control, there is a priority for structural reme-
dies.54
Therefore, even though the new regulatory frame-
work brings economic sector-specific regulation and
competition law closer together, both are and remain
different. Whereas the objectives and the scope of the
two instruments may overlap, the conditions to inter-
vene and the remedies available diverge. Under sectoral
regulation, the intervention takes place ex ante, is
relatively easy on the selected markets, and the obliga-
tions focus mainly on the behaviour of the firms. That
makes its intervention particularly useful (and more
efficient than antitrust) for a market needing on-going
intervention,55 i.e. the market fulfilling the three criteria
identified by the Commission in its recommendation on
relevant markets (high barriers to entry, absence of
dynamic elements behind the barriers, and relative
efficiency of sectoral remedies).
More fundamentally, some have argued that competi-
tion law has been stretched beyond its reasonable
bounds by the new directives.56 This paper shows the
need to distinguish between antitrust principles and
antitrust intervention. The antitrust principles are only a
rigorous economic way of looking at the market and
decrypting the forces at play. Their use should not be
limited for antitrust intervention in markets whose
competitive structures are a priori satisfactory. They
could equally be used for sectoral regulation to control
market power when antitrust would be inefficient to do
so.
To conclude, the hybridisation of the SMP regime
with competition law methodologies does not stretch
antitrust beyond its reasonable limits and does not
replace sectoral regulation by competition law. It is just
an attempt to ensure that regulatory decisions are more
flexible and closer to the economic reality of the market.
It is a big challenge for the European regulators, and
indeed for the whole electronic communications sector.
If it fails, the national authorities and operators will be
entangled in multiple legal challenges to the detriment of
the whole industry. If it succeeds, the authorities’ deci-
sions will be focused and efficient to the benefit of
European citizens.
54 Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council
Regulation 4064/89/EEC and under Commission Regulation
447/98/EC: [2001] O.J. C68/3. Note that behavioural remedies
having structural effects on the market may be imposed under
the Merger Regulation (Case T–120/96 Gencor [1999] E.C.R.
II–753, paras 316–320), and have been extensively used in the
electronic communications sector. However, with the extended
scope of the new regulatory framework and the increased
possibility to rely on behavioural remedies under sector-specific
regulation, it is hoped that the use of behavioural remedies in
merger control will decrease and that the co-operation between
the Merger Department of the Commission and the NRAs will be
enhanced; see A. de Streel, ‘‘European Merger Policy in Elec-
tronic Communications Markets: Past Experience and Future
Prospects’’ [2002], available at: www.tprc.org/TPRC02/Agen-
da02.HTM#merger.
55 See also the non-successful experience in New Zealand which
relied exclusively on competition law to regulate telecoms: M.
Webb and M. Taylor, ‘‘Light-handed Regulation of Telecommu-
nications in New Zealand: Is generic Competition Law Suffi-
cient?’’ [Winter 1998/99] International Journal of
Communications Law and Policy, available at: www.ijclp.org/
basic/archive.html.
56 P. Larouche, ‘‘A closer look at some assumptions underlying
EC regulation of electronic communications’’ [2002] Journal of
Network Industries 3, 148.
542 DE STREEL: THE NEW CONCEPT OF ‘‘SIGNIFICANT MARKET POWER’’: [2003] E.C.L.R.
[2003] E.C.L.R., ISSUE 10 © SWEET & MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]
